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Abstract
We study a novel economic network (supply chain) comprised of wire transfers (electronic pay-
ment transactions) among the universe of firms in Brazil (6.2 million firms). We construct a
directed and weighted network in which vertices represent cities and edges connote pairwise eco-
nomic dependence between cities. Cities (vertices) represent the collection of all firms in that
location and links denote intercity wire transfers. We find a high degree of economic integration
among cities in the trade network, which is consistent with the high degree of specialization found
across Brazilian cities. We are able to identify which cities have a dominant role in the entire
supply chain process using centrality network measures. We find that the trade network has a
disassortative mixing pattern, which is consistent with the power-law shape of the firm size distri-
bution in Brazil. After the Brazilian recession in 2014, we find that the disassortativity becomes
even stronger as a result of the death of many small firms and the consequent concentration of
economic flows on large firms. Our results suggest that recessions have a large impact on the trade
network with meaningful and heterogeneous economic consequences across municipalities. We
run econometric exercises and find that courts efficiency plays a dual role. From the customer
perspective, it plays an important role in reducing contractual frictions as it increases economic
transactions between different cities. From the supplier perspective, cities that are central suppliers
to the supply chain seem to use courts inefficiency as a lawsuit barrier from their customers.
Keywords: Networks, firm trade networks, wire transfers, supply chains.
IThiago C. Silva (Grant no. 308171/2019-5, 408546/2018-2), Diego R. Amancio (Grant no. 304026/2018-2), and
Benjamin M. Tabak (Grant no. 310541/2018-2, 425123/2018-9) gratefully acknowledge financial support from the
CNPq foundation. Diego R. Amancio also acknowledges financial support from FAPESP (Grant no. 16/19069-9)
∗Corresponding author. Address: Universidade Cato´lica de Brası´lia, QS 07 – Lote 01, EPCT, CEP 71966-700,
Brası´lia, DF.
Email addresses: thiago.christiano@ucb.br (Thiago Christiano Silva), diego@icmc.usp.br (Diego
Raphael Amancio), benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com (Benjamin Miranda Tabak)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier August 12, 2020
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
06
88
9v
2 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 10
 A
ug
 20
20
1. Introduction
Cities welfare is a crucial component to foster the development of economies both at the re-
gional and national levels. Due to decreasing trade costs, it is notable the growing specialization
of municipalities (Brunelle, 2013). While specialization promotes efficiency gains in the form
of economies of scale, it also increases economic dependence among different cities. Such de-
pendence creates the need of cities to transact with each other to ensure provision of all needed
goods and services that are not produced locally. The economic dependence among all pairs of
cities gives rise to a complex supply chain and becomes relevant to be studied under this sce-
nario of rising specialization. Analyzing the economic flows network formed by these economic
transactions can uncover many interesting aspects of cities, including their relative importance and
substitutability in the national supply chain.
The bulk of the literature on supply chains employ formal models and numerical exercises to
help understand crucial aspects of supply networks (Ma et al. (2020) and Chan et al. (2019)). This
is due to the difficulty in finding empirical databases that allow performing empirical exercises
with the intent of gaining a better understanding of supply chain networks, the relevance of the
nodes in the network and how they interact with other variables such as inequality, local activity
and job concentration levels, city size, courts efficiency, among others.
Economic transactions among different cities are mostly performed (in volume) by firms. In
this paper, we construct an economic flows network in which connections represent business trans-
actions between firms from different cities. To do so, we use a novel dataset of wire electronic
transfers—i.e., payments for specific goods or services from another counterparty—among any
two active firms in Brazil from 2002 to 2017. We then aggregate firms within the same municipal-
ity to construct a municipality-level network of economic flows. Therein, connections represent
the sum of all business payments from two cities that arise due to firm-to-firm payments.1 With
this network, we are able to apply complex network theory to extract topological features and give
economic meaning to the most widely used indicators in the related literature.
Brazil has several interesting characteristics that are worth investigating from the viewpoint of
economic flows networks. First, it is an important emerging economy that is divided into five vast
regions (Northeast, North, Midwest, Southeast, and South) with a total of 5,570 municipalities.
Second, due to its continental dimensions and spatial particularities, regions are subject to different
climate and geographical conditions, generating the need of trading between different regions.
Therefore, we expect that the number of economic transactions between firms residing in different
and distant cities to be relevant. Such high number of municipalities and the growing specialization
of different cities provide an ideal setup for a complex network analysis that we tackle in this
paper. Third, Brazil faced a deep recession from 2014 to 2016 that had strong reflections on firm
performance and probability of survival. Many small firms suffered from such recession and went
bankrupt. Since our dataset goes from 2002 to 2017, we are able to understand how the recession
had its tool on the structure of the economic flows network in Brazil.
1The more city i transacts with city j (by means of firms residing in each of these cities), the higher the dependence
of i on j is. This economic dependence can arise when, for instance, an agricultural firm sells its primary goods to an
industrial firm located in another city or even when it sells to an individual outside the city.
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Most of the works in the empirical literature that employs economic flows networks rely on
very aggregate data, such as at the country level.2 When we are dealing with networks, aggregation
can hide important structural aspects of the network and compromise the results and conclusions.
For instance, in the case that there are many cycles in the network, the more one aggregates
the network by joining vertices one into another, the fewer the number of cycles we get in the
resulting network. Therefore, most of the network measures that use interconnection patterns
(such as centrality indicators, network cyclicality, average geodesic path, and many others)—and
therefore are sensitive to the existence of cycles—become severely compromised, normally having
their levels underestimated.
Our data goes from 2003 to 2017, enabling us to understand whether the structure of the
Brazilian trade network has changed over time, particularly after the global financial crisis in
2008. We find that the network has a perceptive disassortative mixing, which is consistent with
the fact that the firm size distribution in Brazil has a power-law structure (few large firms and
many small firms). Interestingly, we find that the network assortativity remains roughly stable
from 2003 to 2014, after which it drops. This may be related to the fact that Brazil suffered a deep
recession after 2014 and is being at recovery ever since. In these stressed scenario, the number of
firms decreased because many firms failed, mostly likely the small ones. In this way, the network
became even more disassortative, with large firms concentrating more economic transactions and
hence becoming more central.
We find a large degree of economic integration among cities, which we measure using the
dependence on external suppliers and customers. This high coupling corroborates the high degree
of specialization of cities either in agricultural, industry, or services activities. This evidence favors
David Ricardo theory, in which cities should specialize in what they enjoy comparative advantage.
By performing a network centrality analysis, we find that the Sa˜o Paulo is the most central
municipality in Brazil, which is consistent with its largest GDP share in Brazil. Rio de Janeiro
follows. Interestingly, the centrality dynamics of Sa˜o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are strongly cor-
related, which reflects their strong economic relationship. While at the regional level average
centralities remain roughly the same, if we dive into a state-level analysis, we find some interest-
ing facts. For instance, in the South, Curitiba has been gaining more importance at the cost a fall
in centrality of Porto Alegre. In the North region, Belem importance deeply falls after 2008 and
Manaus gains the first position in that region. In the Northeast, while Recife and Salvador place
at first and second in turns, we see a large increase in importance of Fortaleza, particularly after
2008.
We also run econometric exercises to understand how socioeconomic, legal and demography
characteristics of Brazilian municipalities correlate with network centrality (PageRank), degree
(number of suppliers and customers), and strength (total received and paid). Such analysis permits
us understand the underlying drivers of these measures. We match our city-level wire transfers
data set explored in the previous section with several socioeconomic, Judiciary and demography
databases. We find that courts efficiency plays a dual role. From the customer perspective, it plays
2For instance, see Fagiolo et al. (2008); Fan et al. (2014); Serrano & Bogun˜a´ (2003); Shen et al. (2015) for
empirical research on the global economic network. A notable exception is Hussain et al. (2019), who study a network
of cities at the global level.
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an important role in reducing contractual frictions as it increases economic transactions between
different cities. From the supplier perspective, cities that are central suppliers to the supply chain
seem to use courts inefficiency as a lawsuit barrier from their customers.
Our approach is completely novel as this type of dataset is quite difficult to obtain and only
countries in which financial authorities track these data can implement such analysis. We con-
tribute to the literature on network analysis by constructing different indexes for each municipality
in Brazil using the particularities of the economic network composed of wire transfers among
cities.
2. Related Works
Our work closely relates to the literature on economic flows networks. Broadly speaking,
we can divide such literature into theoretical- and empirical-oriented work. While theoretical
works attempt to explain the nature of connections—i.e., the underlying reasons that promote the
existence or absence of links between any two economic agents (such as firms, households, cities,
and countries)3—empirical works seek to understand the role of the network structure that arise
from every connection among economic agents. Our work falls in the second category.
There has been much effort in understanding economic flows networks in the empirical lit-
erature. For instance, there is a large body of research studying the world trade economic flows
network. In this line of research, Serrano & Bogun˜a´ (2003) investigate the topological characteris-
tics of the world trade web modeled as a binary and undirected graph. The work in (Fagiolo et al.,
2008) instead uses a weighted network and analyzes the temporal topological properties of world
trade economic flows networks. In turn, Fan et al. (2014) explores the countries’ roles in the world
trade network using traditional measures borrowed from the complex networks literature while
the work in (Shen et al., 2015) uses an approach of flow distances. Our work contributes to this
literature by providing a complex network analysis on a more disaggregate data (city level), rather
than on very very aggregate data, such as the above-referenced works (country level). The use of
more granular data permits us to better reflect the real nature of economic networks.
Our work also connects to the large body of literature discussing networks and financial net-
works: time-varying causal networks (Song et al., 2016), spillovers in volatility for energy firms
networks (Restrepo et al., 2018), effect of networks on innovation (Chuluun et al., 2017), political
connections, centrality and firm innovation (Tsai et al., 2019), discussion of the strategic benefit
of a firms centrality in its competitive advantage (Larran˜eta et al., 2019), bank-firm multiplex net-
works (Li et al., 2019)), risk contagion (Wang et al., 2019)), systemic risk measures (Guerra et al.,
2016), insolvency and contagion (Souza et al., 2015), directed clustering coefficients (Tabak et al.,
2014), dynamic spanning trees (Sensoy & Tabak, 2014), feedback centrality of default probabili-
ties (de Souza et al., 2016), topological properties of stock market networks (Tabak et al., 2010),
calculating systemic risk using feedback between real and financial sectors (Silva et al., 2017a),
role of financial institutions (Silva et al., 2016b) and (Cajueiro & Tabak, 2008), financial networks
3For instance, Helpman et al. (2008) develop a model of heterogeneous firms to predict the existence or not of
connections between different countries. They find that connections and their trade volume (link weight) yield a
generalized gravity equation.
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and efficiency (Silva et al., 2016a), and estimating vulnerability and impact diffusion (Silva et al.,
2017b). Our work innovates by documenting structural aspects of a city-level economic networks
of an important emerging country (Brazil). Such type of data is difficult to obtain due to its secrecy.
3. Data Description
We use transaction-level data from the SPB, which encompasses the Sistema de Transfereˆncia
de Reservas (STR) and the Sistema de Transfereˆncia de Fundos (CIP-Sitraf), to construct our
firm-to-firm network.4 The BCB maintains both STR and CIP-Sitraf, which are real-time gross
settlement payment systems that record electronic interbank transactions in Brazil.
The payment transfers data comprises 6.2 million firms and has about 410 million transactions
with a total commercial trading value of R$ 48 trillion among firms between January 2003 and
December 2014. To get a sense of the transacted volume, this corresponds to more than 20 times
the annual nominal GDP of Brazil in 2014. Our payment data contains about 9 million firm local
branches that transacted at least once.
In our analysis, we aggregate payments of all firms residing in the same city, i.e., we go from
the more granular firm-time level to the less granular city-time level. The rationale is to understand
the network structure of economic inflows and outflows among cities, which can reveal important
insights of the economic role and function among cities. Due to this comprehensive dataset, we
can map the entire network of economic dependencies among Brazilian cities over time. To avoid
considering taxes and public fines, we exclude payments involving wire transfers from firms to the
public administration institutions.
We classify cities as suppliers or customers by following the direction of money transfers. Sup-
pliers are receivers of money and therefore reside in the creditor side of the monetary transaction.
Customer cities are the payers of the money and are on the debtor side of the transaction. This
identification permits us to navigate through the entire supply chain in Brazil. For instance, by
following the chains of the supplier to the customer, we navigate downstream in the supply chain.
4. Network measurements
Complex networks have been used in a wide area of applications (Henrique et al., 2019). This
include areas as diverse as Biology (Konini & van Rensburg, 2017), Natural Language Process-
ing (Akimushkin et al., 2017; Amancio et al., 2015), Data Science (Pham et al., 2015), Scientomet-
rics Wang et al. (2017), Time Series Analysis (Gao et al., 2015), and real-world applications (Jain
& Katarya, 2019; Kouni et al., 2019; Maji et al., 2020; Namtirtha et al., 2020; Srinivas & Rajen-
dran, 2019; Zareie & Sheikhahmadi, 2018). A network comprises nodes, which are linked via
edges. Several measurements have been devoted along the last years to study the network struc-
ture. Below we summarize some of the most important measures used for this purpose. These
measurements are used here to study the main properties of the network modeling intercity eco-
nomic flows.
4CIP-Sitraf clears most of the transfers in Brazil. STR is used to clear high-valued transactions. In this way,
CIP-Sitraf has the largest quantity of payments, mainly of low values. STR, on the other hand, has fewer transactions
but concentrate the most representative volume of monetary transfers.
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1. Density: the density of measures how connected is the network. It is defined as the ration
between the number of edges and the total in a complete network with the same number of
nodes. In other words, if E is the number of edges and N is the number of nodes, the density
is defined as d = E/N(N−1).
2. Degree: the degree of a node is related to the total number of links linked to that node.
3. Assortativity: this measurement quantifies whether edges link nodes with similar character-
istics. In this case, a network is assortative if highly connected nodes tend to connect with
other highly connected nodes. Conversely, a network is disassortative if highly connected
nodes are linked with low-degree nodes. This measurement can be quantified by measuring
the degree correlation of linked nodes.
4. Diameter: the diameter of a network is related to the concept of shortest path (Newman,
2003). A shortest path is a path in a network linking two nodes with minimum length. The
diameter of the network is maximum shortest path length linking the nodes in the network.
5. PageRank: the PageRank algorithm is a method to measure the importance of nodes in the
network. Unlike other measurements based on strictly local features (such as degree) or
quasi-local features (such as hierarchical measurements (Silva & Zhao, 2016)), the PageR-
ank uses global information to measure the centrality of a node. More specifically, the im-
portance of a node is proportional to the importance of nodes linked to it. Mathematically,
the PageRank pi(vi) of node vi is computed as
pi(vi) =
1−α
N
+α ∑
v j∈V (vi)
pi(vi)
K(v j)
, (1)
where α is a constant to account for the probability that a random walker visit a randomly
picked node in the whole network, V (vi) is the set of nodes connected to vi (in-going links
to vi) and K(v j) is the set of outgoing links from v j.
While there are many other complex network analysis, here we decided to focus on the most
common measurements to characterize the main topological features of the network. A detailed
description of the above measurements and more applications can be found elsewhere (Newman,
2018; Silva & Zhao, 2016).
5. Network topological analysis of the Brazilian intercity economic flows
In this section, we analyze the structural features of the Brazilian network of intercity economic
flows using complex network theory. We follow Silva & Zhao (2016)’s classification of network
measures.
We start with global network measures. Figure 1a portrays the network assortativity. We ob-
serve that the Brazilian network of intercity economic flows presents a disassortative mixing, with
an average assortativity of −0.25 from 2002 to 2017. In this setting, small cities tend to connect
to bigger cities, which act as hubs to the entire supply chain of Brazil. This network structure
also has small network diameter, suggesting the existence of the small-world phenomenon in the
network structure. That is, regardless of the geographical distances, cities tend to reside near each
other in the economic sense (connections in the network).
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Figure 1: Network assortativity and density from the Brazilian intercity trade network between 2003 and 2017.
Looking at Figure 1a, we observe three different behaviors for the network assortativity. From
2002 to 2005, the network tends to evolve to a more disassortative structure, suggesting that city
hubs tend to concentrate more connections and hence become more important to the economic
flows among cities in Brazil. From 2006 to 2012, we have the opposite feature: the network tends
to become more assortative, meaning that connections become more dispersed throughout other
cities apart from the hubs. This reduces the relative network importance of the hubs and fosters
the existence of more local economic dependence rather than national dependencies warranted by
the hubs, which link cities far apart from each other. Finally, from 2013 to 2017, we see a strong
decrease of the network assortativity, raising the importance of city hubs to the entire national
supply chain. City hubs are the most central cities in the network, which we identify in this sector
later on.
Figure 1b exhibits the network density—another global network measure—of the Brazilian
network of intercity economic flows. We observe that the density ranges from roughly 0.25%
to 3.25%. We can interpret these numbers as probabilities: if we randomly take two cities in
Brazil, there is a probability that they transact with each other of 0.25% in 2002 and 3.25% in
2017, conditioned on the observable wire transfers. Following the rule-of-thumb in the complex
network literature, this network is considered as very sparse, which corroborates the existence of
city centers that link regional cities far apart. These regional cities have small degree (number of
other city counterparts) and strength (intensity of transfers to other counterparts) network measure,
while those centers have high degree and strength.
Table 1 reports the ranking of the top 30 most central cities in the Brazilian network of intercity
economic flows in 2003 and 2014. The network centrality is a mixed network measure because
it uses not only topological network information in the direct neighborhood but also in indirect
neighborhoods. We take Google PageRank as our baseline centrality measure. The top 10 most
central cities remain the same both in 2003 and 2014, suggesting that the core and most central
cities persist over time. In contrast, we see more fluctuations of the other cities in the rank.
City capitals are the ones that tend to connect cities far apart and therefore are the most prob-
able candidates of being hubs of the supply chain network in Brazil. Figures 2a–2e show the
evolution of the network centrality for the capitals of the Southeast, South, Midwest, North, and
Northeast, respectively. The South and Southeast are the most developed in Brazil, while the Mid-
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west contains Brası´lia, which is the federal district of Brazil. The North and Northeast are the least
developed regions in Brazil. Sa˜o Paulo is by far the most central city in Brazil, followed by Rio
de Janeiro, both located in the Southeast region. Their relative importance to the entire network
remains stable over time, evidencing their importance to the entire supply chain in Brazil.
The relative importance of some capitals change over time. For instance, in the South region,
the relative importance of Curitiba quickly increases after 2011, while that of Porto Alegre de-
creases in the same period. In the North, Bele´m remained as the most important regional center
until 2008, after which Manaus took the top 1 place in the region. All the other capitals in the
North have very small importance, suggesting that the link of the North region to the remainder of
the country goes through Manaus and Bele´m. In the Northeast region, we observe a large hetero-
geneity. While we observe a steady and large importance for Recife and Salvador, the importance
of Fortaleza quickly increases after 2007. The role of Sa˜o Luis and Joa˜o Pessoa in the network
decreases before 2008, and remains rather stable after then. In the Midwest, we observe a quick
increase of the importance of Brası´lia throughout the entire sample period.
Figure 3 presents a scatterplot of the downstream centrality versus city size (measured using
GDP), for specific years (the years are reflected by the shading of the observation, with more recent
years being darker). If the city is a capital, then the color is blue and, if it is not, the color is red.
By fitting a standard OLS curve, we find a positive correlation between city size and downstream
centrality, suggesting that larger cities are more central. Such relationship tends to increase over
time and is invariant over different Brazilian regions. In particular, capitals seem to affect this
relationship by making it stronger.
We present the evolution over time of the average upstream and downstream centralities for
each Brazilian region in Figure 4. Our results highlight major differences across Brazil. Down-
stream Centrality is high over this time period for the Southeast, whereas upstream centrality is
high for the Northern Region (although there is a downward trend over time). There is also an
upward trend in the downstream centrality in the Midwest (almost doubles in a decade).
Table 2 shows the top 30 cities with largest dependence on external customers and suppliers in
2014, respectively. These measures are strictly local. That is, their economic relies on customers
buying or suppliers selling products/services in other cities rather than within the same city. A large
external dependence corroborates the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage in which cities
should specialize in the production of those goods and services in which they enjoy comparative
advantage. In this case, we would observe a large economic integration among cities. Overall, we
observe a high external dependence, allowing us to conclude for the existence of a strong economic
integration across Brazilian cities.
Figure 5 presents the evolution of dependence on external customers and suppliers. In the be-
ginning of our sample, the dependence on external customers and suppliers in different regions of
Brazil was high. Over time, this dependence substantially reduces. The dependence on external
customers is still high in some regions, such as in the Midwest, South and Southeast (approxi-
mately 50%). An additional finding is that average regional dependence on external suppliers is
lower than that on customers, suggesting that there was strong investments in reducing the depen-
dence on external suppliers in Brazilian regions.
We can also analyze how the entire city-specific distribution of dependence on external cus-
tomers and supply behave over time in Figures 6a and 6b, respectively. We segregate by city size
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Figure 2: Evolution of network centrality for Brazilian capitals of the (a) Southeast, (b) South, and (c) Midwest
regions. We evaluate network centrality using the downstream perspective, i.e., links follow the money flow. Data is
smoothed with a time window of two years from 2003–2014.
10
South Southeast
Midwest North Northeast
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 0% 2% 4% 6% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4%
0
20
40
0
20
40
60
0
200
400
600
0
50
100
150
200
0
20
40
60
80
Downstream centrality
G
DP
 [in
 R
$ b
i]
Is capital? No Yes Year 20042006
2008
2010
2012
2014
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Figure 5: Evolution of the average regional dependence on external customers (red or circle-shaped curve) and
suppliers (blue or triangle-shaped curve) for cities for the period 2003–2014.
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in accordance with the city population distribution.5 The dependence on external customers re-
duces over the sample period. This trend is robust across regions in Brazil. However, when we
compare small, medium and large cities, we find that the reduction in this dependence is stronger
in small cities for all regions. This is also true for medium cities in the North region. However, in
other regions such as the South and Southeast, medium cities are still highly dependent on external
customers.
Looking now at the dependence on external suppliers, there is also a trend suggesting the
reduction of external dependence of large cities, although the results are more heterogeneous in
this case. In the Midwest, Southeast and Northeast, small cities became even less dependent on
external suppliers, which suggests that they are more diversified in the present than they were
before. There is also a reduction in the external dependence of medium cities, but not as strong as
the one occurred in small and large cities.
6. Socioeconomic, legal, and demographic drivers of the wire transfers network
In this section, we apply an econometric exercise to understand how socioeconomic, legal and
demography characteristics of Brazilian municipalities correlate with network centrality (PageR-
ank), degree (number of suppliers and customers), and strength (total received and paid). Such
analysis permits us understand the underlying drivers of these measures. We match our city-level
wire transfers data set explored in the previous section with several socioeconomic, Judiciary and
demography databases. We explore each of them as we discuss the econometric specifications.
To understand the correlates that drive city-level network measures, we use the following
panel-data specification:
yirt = αrt +βTXirt + εirt , (2)
in which i, r, and t index city, region (of the city), and time (in years). We use as outcome variables
yirt the following city-level network measures: downstream and upstream PageRank centrality, in-
degree (number of customers), out-degree (number of suppliers), in-strength (total received), and
out-strength (total paid). The factor εirt is the standard error term. We use robust error clustering
at the city-level in all our specifications. The term αrt is a region-time fixed effects, whose intro-
duction enables comparisons of municipalities only of the same Brazilian region. Since Brazil has
continental dimensions with five regions (North, Northeast, Midwest, Southeast, and South) with
very different socioeconomic, demographic, and cultural aspects, the within-region comparison
mitigates concerns about omitted variables related to non-observable time-variant characteristics
of these five regions.
The vectorX contains all the socioeconomic, legal and demographic characteristics that could
drive city outcome variables. We use a broad set of regressors, such as to have a comprehensive
picture of the underlying drivers of the network measures of Brazilian cities. We use the following
regressors:
5Small, medium, and large cities correspond to the bottom, middle, and upper terciles of the regional-specific city
GDP distribution.
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• Municipal GDP: we believe that the city’s size can have a strong role on some network
measures. For instance, bigger cities are more likely to intermediate more economic trans-
actions, have more firms, and perform more transactions with firms in other cities. This data
is public and comes from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatı´stica (IBGE), which is
the agency responsible for official collection of statistical, geographic, cartographic, geode-
tic and environmental information in Brazil.
• Share of the total municipal exports to its GDP: we introduce this variable to capture any
differences of the impact of domestic- and foreign-oriented economies on the city-level
network measures. Exporting cities may have an economic local machinery and needs that
are fundamentally different from those domestic-oriented cities. Since our network captures
domestic economic transactions among different cities, such economy orientation may have
an impact on how and to what extent exporting cities engage in the national supply chain
comparatively to domestic-oriented cities. This data is public and comes from the Ministe´rio
da Indu´stria, Come´rcio Exterior e Servic¸os, which is responsible for the development policy
on industry, trade and services, and foreign trade policies.
• Share of total municipal bank credit to its GDP: this variable controls for the local financial
development of cities. There is a large body in the finance-nexus literature that advocates
that financial development correlates with economic growth. Since our network is built from
economic activity among cities through wire transfers payments, banks may have a direct
impact on how and when these cities engage either as suppliers or customers in economic
transactions with other cities. This data is confidential and comes from the Sistema de
Informac¸o˜es de Cre´ditos (SCR), which is maintained by the Banco Central do Brasil.
• The inequality Gini index: this variable controls for the inequality levels of each city. In-
equality can have a deep impact on local economic activity and welfare. Therefore, they
may reflect on how cities engage in new economic transactions with other cities. This data
is public and comes from the population censuses of the IBGE.
• Dependence on external customers and suppliers: this variable controls for the local eco-
nomic structure of each municipality by introducing the level of dependence on suppliers
and customers that are based outside the city. For instance, more dynamic and flexible
economies may have less dependence with external suppliers and customers. These indica-
tors are constructed using the STR, as previously defined.
• Concentration of the bank local credit portfolio: this variable proxies for the concentration
of bank credit to local firms in terms of their industry. We evaluate such measure using the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for city i as follows:
HHIbank creditit =
(
Agricultureit
Total Creditit
)2
+
(
Manu f acturingit
Total Creditit
)2
+
(
Servicesit
Total Creditit
)2
, (3)
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in which Agricultureit , Manu f acturingit , and Servicesit are the outstanding credit that banks
grant to firms in the agriculture, manufacturing, and services in city i at year t. Moreover,
Total Creditit = Agricultureit +Manu f acturingit +Servicesit . This data is confidential and
comes from the SCR.
• Concentration of the sectoral local jobs: this variables controls for the concentration of job
in different sectors of the city. We also compute this measure using HHI as follows:
HHIjobit =
(
Manu f acturingit
Total Jobsit
)2
+
(
Constructionit
Total Jobsit
)2
+
(
Tradeit
Total Jobsit
)2
+(
Servicesit
Total Jobsit
)2
+
(
Agricultureit
Total Jobsit
)2
, (4)
in which Manu f acturingit , Constructionit , Tradeit , Servicesit , Agricultureit are the total
number of formal jobs in the manufacturing, construction, trade, services, and agriculture
sectors, respectively, in city i at year t. In addition, Total Jobsit = Manu f acturingit +
Constructionit + Tradeit + Servicesit +Agricultureit . This data is public and comes from
the Relac¸a˜o Anual de Informac¸o˜es Sociais (RAIS), which is maintained by the Ministe´rio
da Economia.
• Human development index (HDI): this variable controls for the human development levels
in three different dimensions: income, health, and education. We take this data from Firjan,
which is a network of private nonprofit organizations with more than ten thousand associates
that computes the human development index for each city in Brazil since 2005.
• Courts efficiency: this variable controls for the courts efficiency levels. This is a state-level
variable. Therefore, we consider the same court efficiency level for all cities within the same
state. More efficient courts may foster economic development because they reduce contrac-
tual frictions among firms. For instance, firms may be more willingful to provide trade credit
to their firm counterparts because they know that they could execute their guarantees more
rapidly in the local courts.
To evaluate the court efficiency level, we use a DEA model that optimally compares effi-
ciency across different state-level courts. We measure efficiency using the output orienta-
tion, i.e., more efficient courts are those that output more with the same number of inputs.
We use two inputs: (i) litigation backlog size, which quantifies the processes that are pend-
ing in the period, excluding those suspended, in a provisional file and for tax and criminal
executions; and (ii) staff and judges expenditures, excluding expenses with retired staff.
Our output variable is the number of complete cases. We follow the literature and use non-
increasing returns to scale in our DEA model. We take these data from the Justic¸a Nacional
database, which is maintained by the Conselho Nacional de Justic¸a.
Table 3 provides summary statistics of all variables employed in the econometric specification
in (2). We apply a Z-score transformation (subtract mean then divide by standard deviation) on
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all outcome variables employed in this paper. These variables end up with a zero mean and unit
standard deviation. Therefore, our marginal effects are in terms of standard deviations relative to
mean of the outcome variables.
Table 3: Summary statistics of the numerical variables employed in the econometric exercise.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Network measures
Downstream centrality 66,783 0.0004 0.006 0.00003 0.00003 0.00004 0.232
Upstream centrality 66,783 0.0002 0.003 0.00003 0.00003 0.0001 0.177
Number of customers 66,783 67.630 165.710 0 7 56 4,492
Number of suppliers 66,783 67.859 190.119 0 4 53 5,284
Total received (R$ bi) 66,572 1.454 35.194 0.000 0.001 0.047 3,212.708
Total paid (R$ bi) 63,690 1.605 39.423 0.000 0.001 0.026 3,343.833
Dependence on External Customers 66,572 0.767 0.264 0.000 0.596 0.984 1.000
Dependence on External Suppliers 63,690 0.619 0.311 0.000 0.334 0.913 1.000
City characteristics
GDP (R$ bi) 66,783 0.948 9.331 0.004 0.036 0.230 628.065
Exports / GDP 66,783 0.023 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.003 22.716
Total credit / GDP 66,783 0.010 0.075 0.00001 0.002 0.008 9.664
Gini index 66,781 0.514 0.067 0.099 0.472 0.558 0.808
Bank financing concentration (HHI) 66,783 0.636 0.188 0.333 0.501 0.760 1.000
Sectoral jobs concentration (HHI) 66,771 0.501 0.206 0.207 0.337 0.627 1.000
Human development index (HDI) 55,121 0.627 0.125 0.187 0.539 0.721 0.936
Courts efficiency 56,084 0.665 0.140 0.415 0.554 0.747 0.970
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates of Regression 2 when we use the following network mea-
sures as outcomes: downstream centrality (Column (1)), upstream centrality (Column (2)), num-
ber of customers or in-degree (Column (3)), number of suppliers or out-degree (Column (4)), total
received or in-strength (Column (5)), and total paid or out-strength (Column (6)).
If a city has a high downstream centrality, then it connects many customers with suppliers
(which are the main providers of goods and services in the supply chain). This suggests that cities
with high downstream centrality are vital in the economy. These cities are crucial in the devel-
opment process. Our empirical results suggest a positive and statistically significant relationship
between downstream centrality and the log of the city GDP (Column (1) of Table 4), further cor-
roborating the scatterplots in Figure 3. We find that a 1% increase in GDP is correlated with an
increase of 0.12 standard deviation of the downstream centrality. Therefore, high downstream
centrality cities connect suppliers to the firms that are selling goods and services to final clients,
both wholesale and retail. Therefore, a positive correlation is expected.
We also find a positive relationship between downstream centrality and the HHI of sectoral
jobs. An increase of 1 percentage point in the HHI (sectoral jobs) is correlated with an increase
18
of 0.632 in the standard deviation of the downstream centrality. Our results suggest that jobs
specialization (concentration) may impact positively the downstream centrality of the city, giving
support for the specialization theory of David Ricardo. The Gini coefficient is also statistically
significant and positive (0.498), which suggests that there is a correlation between downstream
centrality and income concentration.
Cities with high downstream centrality are cities that possess a large number of clients in the
supply chain. These cities distribute resources to the rest of Brazil. They are therefore important
due to their role in the supply chain. The other side of the coin would be cities with high upstream
centrality. These cities receive a lot of resources from places that depend heavily on them. The
buyer depends on the supply provided by firms in that city. Therefore, we can conceptualize the
upstream centrality as a form of dependency of the city as a supplier in the entire supply chain.
In the Column (2) of Table 4, we present results for the upstream centrality. The Gini coeffi-
cient has a negative correlation with the upstream centrality, that is, the higher the concentration of
income, the lower the upstream centrality. As the upstream centrality connotes the city centrality
from the supplier perspective to the entire supply chain, the more equitable in terms of income, the
more relevant the city will be in this respect. Greater income distribution may allow more busi-
nesses to flourish that produce goods and services that are essential to other businesses, allowing
for increased trade in the supply of goods and services.
The HHI for sectoral jobs also has a negative correlation, though marginally significant. This
result suggests that, if the work is more concentrated in certain sectors, the city has less upstream
centrality. As reflected by the Gini coefficient, the more concentrated the jobs in a sector are, the
less capacity firms will have to provide a diverse list of goods and services, becoming relevant in
the global production chain of goods and services.
It is interesting to note that higher courts efficiency associates with lower upstream centrality.
This may be due to the fact that, in cities where Justice is more efficient, there may be more
lawsuits and more litigation. In this specific case, for suppliers it may be worse to establish the
base of their operations in these type of city.
There is a positive relationship between courts efficiency and the number of customers (Col-
umn (3)) and suppliers (Column (4)). This suggests that, as courts are more efficient in a specific
city, the more firms engage in transactions with customers and suppliers from other cities, which
reflects a positive impact of the Judiciary efficiency on economic transactions. This may be asso-
ciated with the fact that more distant firms are relatively more opaque. Therefore, having a relative
more efficient Judiciary system enables firms to engage in more distant cities, with new and po-
tentially risky clients. Brazil suffers from critics that the Judiciary is relatively inefficient, which
hurts economic transactions. Our results put some light on this relationship and argues for policies
that increases courts efficiency as an important mechanism that may reduce contractual frictions
and therefore increase economic transactions and economic growth.
The Human Development Index (HDI) for income, health, and education, is negatively associ-
ated to the number of customers and suppliers. This result suggests that, as development indicators
improve, the self-sufficiency of the city also increases.
Several factors help explain the total amount received (Column (5)) and total amount paid
(Column (6)) for cities. The size of the city has a positive and statistical relationship with these
two variables, which is intuitive as we would expect a size effect. The Gini coefficient is also
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positive, suggesting that higher inequality implies higher received and paid volumes.
Our findings also suggests that, as the dependence on external customers increase, the total
amount received and paid becomes smaller, whereas the effect of dependence of external suppliers
is the opposite. Trade is higher between cities that have more dependence on external suppliers
and is lower between cities that depend more on external customers.
7. Conclusion
This paper uses a novel dataset composed of wire transfers to study how cities interconnect in
a large and important emerging country. Brazil has over 5,500 municipalities, which together po-
tentially create a very heterogeneous topological structure among different cities. The application
of complex network theory in this type of economic network enables us to understand how supply
chains interconnect across different cities, how central (important) are different cities, and how its
structure changes over time.
We observe that the trade network has a pronounced disassortative mixing pattern, which re-
lates to the power-law shape of firm distributions in Brazil (many small firms and few large firms).
We also find that the assortativity drops after the Brazilian recession in 2014, which may be related
to the fact that small firms failed and large firms concentrated even more economic flows.
We find a large degree of economic integration among cities, which we measure using the
dependence on external suppliers and customers. This high coupling corroborates the high degree
of specialization of cities either in agricultural, industry, or services activities. This evidence favors
David Ricardo theory, in which cities should specialize in what they enjoy comparative advantage.
Municipal capitals are those that tend to connect cities that are very separate and, therefore,
are the most likely candidates to be centers of the supply chain in Brazil. The relative importance
of some cities varies over time. We predict that the ten main cities identified remain the same
regardless of the centrality of the network and the year analyzed. We see more oscillations of the
other cities.
Using the network density, we find that the trade network is very sparse, which confirms the
existence of small urban centers that link very remote regional cities.
We find a network core consisting of cities in the southeast region (metropolitan areas of Belo
Horizonte, Campinas, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo), the southern region (metropolitan areas of
Curitiba and Porto Alegre) and the Federal District.
Our results are important for the design of public policies as we can track down the most rele-
vant cities in a connectedness perspective. Which cities perform a function of core in the network
and may help speed up economic growth. Further research could explore the network using a
variety of networks measures to deepen our understanding of the evolution of these networks.
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